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Abstract
In this paper, I examine some of the arguments that have been put forward against Levin-
son’s historical account of art. These arguments focus upon the conceptual impossibility of
defending a historical account of art when we take into consideration issues regarding the
identification of art in other cultures or worlds. Levinson has tried to make his position
clearer defending himself from these criticisms in a way that seems quite persuasive. How-
ever, as I argue at the end of this article, Levinson’s attempt cannot successfully grasp a
meaning of art that could be identified universally. At the end, his account can only works
if we restrict our application of «art» to works that already belong to our own history of
art and that, correspondingly, satisfy one or more of the artistic regards that have been rel-
evant in our culture.
Key words: art’s definition, artistic regards, art’s nature, historical definition, other cul-
tures, possible worlds, intension and extension of «art».
Resumen. La naturaleza histórica del arte
En este artículo, examino algunos de los argumentos ofrecidos en contra de la definición
histórica del arte defendida por Levinson. Estos argumentos subrayan la imposibilidad de
defender una teoría de este tipo una vez que tomamos en consideración cuestiones rela-
cionadas con la identificación del arte en otras culturas o mundos posibles. Levinson ha
tratado de aclarar su posición a la vez que ha proporcionado algunas respuestas a estas crí-
ticas que parecen convincentes. Sin embargo, como trato de argumentar al final de este
artículo, Levinson no puede dar cuenta de un significado universal del concepto de «arte».
Finalmente, su teoría sólo funciona correctamente cuando la aplicamos a obras que ya per-
tenecen a nuestra historia del arte y que, consecuentemente, satisfacen algunas de las con-
sideraciones artísticas que históricamente han constituido el significado de «arte» en nues-
tra cultura.
Palabras clave: definición del arte, consideraciones artísticas, naturaleza del arte, defini-
ción histórica, otras culturas, mundos posibles, intensión y extensión del término «arte».
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Summary
1. Art’s historical nature: an introduction
One of the ideas that, in some form or another, has entered into contemporary
reflection about art nature is that art is essentially historical. This claim can
be understood in many different ways ranging from the trivial sense in which
we claim many other practices to have a history, to a stronger sense according
to which what art is at a certain moment is historically determined. One of
the authors2 who has currently defended this claim is Jerrold Levinson who
has attempted to provide a definition of art which makes intrinsic reference
to art history. Actually, his definition takes art historicality as its core.
The idea that art has a historical nature has a twofold root. It is partly due
to certain claims held by art historians such as Wöllflin whose dictum «not
everything can become an artwork at any time»3 has become a well-known
commonplace within art theory; the second one is derived from the philo-
sophical response to a certain, important, amount of art production which
defied common assumptions about art before the avant-garde movements.
Among its merits, avant-garde art made possible that a plain object could be
regarded as art thanks in part to the creation of Duchamp’s ready made; this fact
strained common assumptions about art and showed certain theoretical reflec-
tion about the concept of art as necessary in order to bring these new works
into art realm. Actually, both Arthur Danto and Levinson have recognized
avant-garde artistic production as a prompter of the idea we are trying to pur-
sue here4.
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2. Others definitional attempts which take into consideration historical concerns may be
attributed to Arthur Danto (1964), Noël Carroll (1993), and James Carney (1994).
3. This claim, first formulated by Enrich Wölfflin, has been appropriated by many contem-
porary art theorists.
4. Danto has defended the idea that the real problem a philosophical characterization of art must
solve could not be recognized as such before some works of art set the conditions for it to
appear as such problem. Levinson, following Danto in this point, claims that «it is curious
[…] that the highly abstract, self-referential condition I propose as the minimal essence of
art-making is one that could not have been evident to us before the deconstruction, if we
may call it that, performed on the practice of art by the avant-gardists of the early twenti-
eth century» («Extending Art Historically». In: LEVINSON, J. (1996). The Pleasures of Aes-
thetics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 150-171, p. 152).
These two traditions converged at one point: as well as certain material
conditions must be given for a certain object to be produced, certain theoret-
ical atmosphere is required for something to be regarded as art. Certain objects
already considered among the paradigms of art, like the ready-mades by
Duchamp, could not have been regarded as art if they had been done, say,
three centuries earlier. The kind of artistic atmosphere which allowed a ready
made to be art had a totally different structure from the one that made pos-
sible Renaissance painting or, to press back into the past, the cave paintings
of Lascaux (if these latter can be considered art at all). Quoting Levinson at this
point: «what was understood by the term “art” in 1795 is not the same thing
as is understood by the term today […]; what items or activities would have
counted, the reasons why they would have so counted, and what would
have been the paradigms with reference to which counting would have been
assessed were dramatically different»5.
Someone may argue at this point that most of our practices can parallel art
in this respect; specially, science and philosophy have a history in which the
only relevant aspects to take into account are not merely the different theories
proposed within each domain, but also reflections about what counts as science
and philosophy seem to be relevant to trace their respective histories. However,
even if those considerations might have a key role in the task of reconstructing
these practices’ history, it still seems true that we can define them independently
of the historical considerations about their nature; they can be defined, for
example, functionally6. However, for those who take the historicality of art seri-
ously, no functional definition grasps everything that counts as art because, as
its history has widely shown, the range of concerns that have been involved in
art practice is so diverse that no functional theory is able to account for it. So,
an historical definition not only has the virtue of letting these various concerns
to enter into the meaning of art, but also leaves open the possibility for new
concerns to arise as relevant for art production7. It must be noticed that the
true historical account of art does not only rest upon this assumption, but it
underlies the contingent character of the concerns that have historically pro-
vided the content of art. These make up a set that helps present art identifica-
tion, but this set could have contained different concerns if art history had been
different. Historical account of art must then take into account the enrichment
of art meaning through its history and its contingent character.
So, in principle, Levinson would defend the uniqueness of the concept of
art in this sense. Most of our practices are historical in a weak sense, but only
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5. LEVINSON, Jerrold (1996), «Extending Art Historically». In: The Pleasures of Aesthetics. Itha-
ca: Cornell University Press, p. 150-171, p. 150.
6. «Philosophy and science, however varied their manifestations, retain some intrinsic or func-
tional differentia, which is not the case with art» (Levinson, ibid., p. 155).
7. In this sense, Levinson’s definition would be the best proof against the non-definition stance
of most neo-wittgensteinians who, taken as a fact the wide diversity of artworks and art-
regards, claim that art cannot be defined without violating its essential disposition to include
new art-regards.
art is historical in the much stronger sense which implies that art’s meaning
cannot be specified without making explicit reference to its history. And what
the art theorist must do is to find the shape of our concept of art so that it fits
this historical condition.
I will first examine Levinson’s definition paying special attention to its his-
torical aspect. Second, although he has proved an impetuous energy in pro-
viding answers to the many and diverse criticism against his view, I would like
to focus upon Gregory Currie’s criticism formulated in his article «A note on
Art and Historical Concepts» and Stephen Davies’ concerns against what he
names the «artworld relativity» problem. I think both authors have provided
some arguments against Levinson’s definition, and have supported the idea
that a certain concept of art not dependent upon a certain history or tradition
seems necessary to identify art across different traditions.
Besides, these authors’ arguments can be taken as contributing to one of
the positions of a wider debate concerning art’s nature. This debate, which is
far from ended, is settled between those who think that art’s nature can be
fixed through a priori reflection about art, and those who embrace the view
that art’s nature is essentially historical, so that what is art at a moment t
depends upon certain relationship between the object and the art history with-
in which it is created. This second view makes art’s nature relative to what his-
torically have been considered as art and brings art history within the very
content of the concept of art. We do not need, for our present purposes, to
settle the endpoint to this debate. I merely hope to show that there is a cer-
tain intuition about art identification which is kept in these criticisms against
Levinson that should be preserved and that will render Levinson’s view insuf-
ficient.
2. Jerrold Levinson’s intentional-historical definition of art
Jerrold Levinson has provided an intentional-historical art definition which
makes both artists’ intentions and historical issues essential to art. I will pay
attention to the historical feature of his definition, that is, to what he terms
his «intrinsic historicist» claim about art. For Levinson, art is a special kind of
concept whose content cannot be given independently from what has been
historically taken as art. Thus, his definition has a structure which provides
«the meaning of “art at t” […] in terms of the extension of “art prior to t”»8
that is, were the extension of art prior to t different from the one it actually
is, the meaning of art would be different. Levinson’s definition has a recursive
structure which aims at providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for
something to be an artwork at a certain time. His complete definition is the
following:
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8. LEVINSON, J. (2004). «Defining art Historically». In: Peter LAMARQUE and Stein HAUGOM
OLSEN (eds.). Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. The Analytic Tradition. An Anthology.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, p. 35-46, p. 40.
X is an artwork at t = df X is an object of which it is true at t that some person
or persons, having the appropriate proprietary right over X, nonpassingly
intends (or intended) X for regard-as-a-work-of-art —i.e., regard in any way
(or ways) in which objects in the extension of “artwork” prior to t are o were
correctly (or standardly) regarded9.
Thus, he introduces past art-relevant regards and past artworks into the
conditions that take part of the intention of an artist to make an artwork; that
is, he brings art-historical considerations into the conditions for something to
become an artwork. Note, however, that Levinson’s definition is meant to avoid
the charge of circularity for the meaning of «artwork» is not included in the
right hand of the definition but merely its past extension to some point. Art is
characterized in such a way that its content cannot be specified regardless its
actual art history. As Levinson’s puts it: «that art is necessarily backward-look-
ing (though in some cases not consciously so) is a fact that the definition of
art must recognize»10.
We can see that his definition provides a function which, once properly
filled, will provide the meaning of art at t. It does not refer to any specific prop-
erty of the object which aspires to arthood, neither it appeals to any function
a work is supposed to satisfy. It aims, nevertheless, as providing an essential
feature of art’s nature: the historical enrichment of its essence. As with other def-
initions, we expect from Levinson’s proposal that it provides necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for a work to be (regarded as) art, and, in principle, we also
expect it adjust to our intuitions about works that aspire to be included with-
in art realm but that fail to do so, that is, we expect certain normative char-
acter from an art definition.
Once we have seen how Levinson’s incorporates into his definition this
backward-looking of art, we can introduce some criticisms against it. As I hope
to show, these share a common worry concerning the lack of specificity of the
notion of regard-as-a-work-of-art introduced by Levinson. Finally, I will offer
one more reason against Levinson’s definition sufficiency for art identification.
3. Gregory Currie’s criticism to art as an historical concept
Gregory Currie11 has argued that Levinson’s definition cannot properly char-
acterize art as an historical concept in the way he intends because historical
concepts must have a structure which, in fact, overrides the very aim of Levin-
son’s attempt.
Following Currie’s argument, in order to make intelligible the idea that
our concept of art is historically determined, we must admit that our concept
would have been different had its history been different. If we are to make
Art’s historical nature Enrahonar 38/39, 2007 163
9. LEVINSON, ibid., p. 40.
10. LEVINSON, ibid., p. 35.
11. CURRIE, G. (2000), «A Note on Art and Historical Concepts». British Journal of Aesthetics,
vol. 40, nº 1, January, p. 186-190.
sense of a different concept of art which, by definition, is not ours, we must have
a way to identify it as an art concept all the same; this implies, in his view, we
need to make reference to an overarching concept of art that binds our concept
and other possible concepts of art together. Otherwise, how can we identify
such concepts as concepts of art? Thus, he claims that for our concept of art
being really historical it should have something like the following structure.
(i) We need a concept of art that it is our actual concept.
(ii) Where its being our actual concept depends on some contingent matter
of history.
(iii) We need a concept, or some concepts, that we might have had, had things
been different with history of art.
(iv) And we need some overarching concept that binds them altogether —that
shows that they are all, indeed, concepts of art12.
The necessity of (iv) is shown after applying to the concept of art the bi-
dimensional structure for a semantic of possible worlds that, in Currie’s view,
can help us elucidate the structure that historical concepts must have. He claims
that given that a historical concept must have these elements, its structure is the
same as natural concepts’ identification across possible worlds; moreover, this
analogy, when properly developed, shows that in order to make sense of the iden-
tification of art across different worlds we need to make reference to an already
possessed concept of art which serves to bind different artistic practices. This
proves, in his view, that the very attempt at characterizing a concept as historic
requires that we already have a certain characterization of that very concept.
Thus, if Currie’s argument is right the very conditions that make intelli-
gible the concept of art as an historical concept undermine its essential his-
toricality, for it is part of the structure of such concepts that we already possess
a concept of art which, somehow, relates the different art concepts identified
across different worlds. Although Currie’s analogy between «art» and «water»
—which is the term used in his analogy between natural kinds’ identification
across possible worlds and historical concepts— may be questioned13, we can
retain by the moment the idea that certain reference to an overarching con-
cept of art must be necessary if we are to characterize different art-histories as
art histories at all.
3.1. Levinson’s answer to Currie’s criticism
Levinson’s response to Currie is twofold; first, he argues against Currie that
he misidentifies his target. Our concept of art is that of a practice which, what-
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12. CURRIE, ibid., p. 187.
13. In his answer to Currie’s criticism, Levinson focus upon the illicitness of the analogy between
«water» and «art» that Currie holds in order to obtain his conclusion. As Levinson shows the
bi-dimensional semantics of possible worlds valid for natural kinds identification does not
provide a good frame for analysing historical concepts such as «art».
ever the particular regards that have become part of its content, «would have
(not) been different if actual art history had been different»14, simply because,
in Levinson’s account the concept of art is one whose structure would not be
different in other possible worlds, what would be different is its content, that
is, the specific set of art regards relevant in each case. We must distinguish,
then, between the concept of art —which, according to Levinson would have
the structure he offers in his definition— and the meaning of art at t, which
is given once we specify the extension of «art prior to t». The former does not
suffer any change across different worlds, while the second would be recep-
tive to the different histories in which its content is specified.
The second line of argument developed by Levinson may be regarded
as a consequence of the first. Thus, when trying to make sense of the role
—demanded by Currie— of an overarching concept of art for identifying other
possible concepts of art, he claims that this concept of art cannot be other than
ours, and the art regards according to which we will identify other regards as
artistic cannot be but ours as well. So, where these answers leave us then?
We have seen that, according to Levinson, the problem raised by Currie is
not an actual problem for his definition, for he claims our concept of art would
be the same in other possible worlds; that is, it will be a concept defining a
practice whose objects will be identified recursively according to the extension
of the concept so far. The concept has a structure such that its content expands
historically, regardless the specific art-regards which the artist takes into account
as part of his or her intention. What would vary, from one world to another,
would be the specific art-regards considered as relevant in each case, since dif-
ferent histories would yield different set of art regards. «Art» for them would
mean something different from what «art» means for us, although the con-
cept of art for both of us operates in the same manner, that is, recursively:
through the relationship that an object has with the art history within which
it has been forged by an artist. But then, Levinson acknowledges that it is like-
ly that our means to recognize the artistic regards relevant for other worlds
cannot be but relating them to our own relevant artistic regards. These need not
be understood as features of our concept of art reached through a priori reflec-
tion, but as a set of features which contingently have constituted the content
or meaning of our concept of art.
That our relevant art regards are fixed a posteriori does not deprive them
from their role at all; that they are contingent (some others could have been
taking part of the relevant set and some of the included could have been absent
if art history had been different) makes them no less essential. Moreover, that
we cannot recognize others’ relevant art regards without making reference to our
own relevant art regards seems a fact that we can hardly avoid. How else could
we? Our regards are contingent but normative within our artistic practice given
its actual history.
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I believe that part of the resistance showed against Levinson’s proposal has
something like the following thought behind: we expect our definitions to
have a certain normative character, that is, they have the power to include or
exclude art. In Levinson’s the art regards that provide art’s meaning are con-
tingent, because historical, and thus we get that art’s essence is contingently
determined, instead of aprioristically. The reason in favour of an a-historical
account of art is, I think, that we are able to identify art in traditions differ-
ent from our own tradition. But, once we identify art meaning with art his-
tory we seem unable to tell what art can be for others, since art has been iden-
tified with art «for us». There remains the point that it is likely that we cannot
proceed differently in this matter: given art history, this is the way it is; so what
we have to do is to give up worries about others’ art.
4. Stephen Davies’ criticism against artworld relativity
Although differently stated, Stephen Davies15 has formulated a similar worry
concerning definitional attempts that bring historical constituents into the
very conditions of art identification. For him, Levinson’s definition would
fall under the «artworld relativity problem» which, briefly stated, consists in
the following: once we admit that what art is must be specified in relation
to an artworld (a concrete art history in Levinson’s account) and, also, that
there can be temporal and geographically distinct artistic traditions, art-
worlds, or art histories, we lack a criterion to identify artworlds as such from
other similar structures whose modus operandi can be parallel to the one spec-
ified in Levinson’s definition. Since the specific art-regards that enter into
art practice can vary from one history to another, we cannot, on the barely
basis of a relational property such as the one specified in the historical defi-
nition, discriminate between different histories as art histories rather than
other kind of practice histories, which in a similar way extends its range of
objects through relating new items to past items within that practice. Short-
ly, the problem focus upon the content of the art-regards and the necessity of
specifying what are they if we are to be able to separate art histories from
other practices’ histories.
It is not difficult to see that the element that will help grouping different
histories as art histories is something very similar, if not the same thing, that
could help identifying art across possible worlds in Currie’s argument. What we
need is something that provides a criterion for art identification independently
of the recursive mode given in Levinson’s definition. And this something seems
to point to the content of the art regards mentioned by Levinson but unspec-
ified within the definition.
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15. DAVIES, S. (2001), «Definitions of Art». In: GAUT, Berys and LOPES, Dominic McIver
(eds.). The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. P. 169-179.
5. Does Levinson’s historical definition provide a sufficient condition 
for art identification across different worlds or different traditions?
Currie and Davies’ criticisms seem to converge at one point. Given the his-
torical recursive structure of the concept of art we will be unable to discern
other traditions as artistic, where the meaning of art, given their different his-
tories, is different from ours. And we will not be able to discriminate between
art and other possible historical practices, since they would have same structural
definition. It will not be sufficient to detect a certain recursive enrichment of
their concept of «art», for we should first of all recognize that that is their con-
cept of «art» at all. That is, recursive definitions make other art traditions
opaque to us. Either they have our concept, or we cannot recognize a certain
practice as art on the mere basis of their practice’s recursive self-enrichment.
As I see it, both problems belong to the same family insofar as they demand
certain specification of the regards according to which an object can be legiti-
mately related to previous art practice. But then, if those regards are specified,
it seems that Levinson’s definition is not as purely historical as it aims to be. For,
once we start specifying some regards as artistic over other non-artistic ones, but
equally present in art practice, we surreptitiously introduce the kind of proper-
ties relational definitions tried to take off from the definitional ground, such as
providing an aesthetic experience, being expressive, having significant form, etc.
Both criticisms enact the conflict between two different kinds of art defi-
nitions I pointed out at the beginning of this paper: one is deeply engaged
with providing a concept of art which focuses upon what Levinson calls art’s
regards, that is, the features that have been traditionally thought to be features
of art, and another, more formal as it were, which provides the formal struc-
ture of our concept of art so that it can be filled in with what we have been
historically calling art; but are we leaving outside art history all that needs to
be kept distinguished from art? Certain artistic regards have become obsolete
not merely due to our habit changing, but also because art has traditionally
served to purposes which are out of its strict domain now. For example, some
of the regards under which art have been done are religious representation or
propaganda and, although some of the works we acknowledge as art now could
not have been done without these aspects playing an important role in their
production, I think we can intuitively reject these regards as artistic. But how
can we? The mere fact that certain regards have been operative in the past and
have had a role in constituting artworks is enough for them to be regarded as
sufficient to constitute new artworks, regardless of the fact they are consid-
ered as regards of the relevant artistic type or not.
Thus, given the structure of the historical definition, we cannot provide
an answer to this question because, in spite of Levinson’s attempt at showing
that we do not need any concept else apart from the one we already have, we
need to refer, at least implicitly, to certain intuitions concerning art we have
in order to trace a borderline separating art relevant regards from non relevant
regards for art.
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6. One more possible world example
Let’s propose one more example in terms of possible worlds: Imagine a world
different from ours which have a practice ruled by the same recursive structure
Levinson attributes to the concept of art where, besides, nothing else can be
appealed to in order to identify the practice as, say, philosophy, science, etc. Thus,
this practice will recursively enrich its domain due to the well formed intentions
of its agents. Now, the regards according to which the agents amplify the exten-
sion of the concept labelling their practice are not like ours. But since specific
art regards cannot take part of Levinson’s definition, we cannot, a priori, reject
these regards as non-artistic. Now, can this practice be identified as art?
I find it difficult to identify this practice as art merely by recognizing in it
the same structure Levinson provides in his definition of art. We need some-
thing else. Probably, this further element cannot be provided without intro-
ducing functional aspects of the kind avoided by the historical definitions.
That these constitute the relevant art regards now is the furthest concession
within Levinson’s view, but this does not imply that they are the art regards
that must be operative in any art identification. Thus, he leaves open the pos-
sibility that it could be a complete different set and thus a totally different
notion of art, although not a different concept in his view.
This situation shows, in my view, that even if we concede to relational def-
initions all they require, there are still cases in which the way art identity is
fixed requires reference to things other than the relational properties pointed
out above.
It is likely that we cannot go further given our intuitions about art and,
more significantly, given its history. Levinson develops some important insights
about art, that is, its backward-looking and the apparent contingency of the
regards that have become, however, part of its content for us. Nevertheless,
when confronted with other cultures’ conception of art, his account can offer
few more than a formal structure; but we do not deal with art’s structure, but
with the very art regards that if contingent cannot be used in art identifica-
tion universally.
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